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Letters
Medical Examiners, Coroners,
and Bioterrorism
To the Editor: Federal, state, and local agencies
are developing plans to detect and respond to
bioterrorism. Medical examiners and coroners
should be included in these plans. A
multifaceted response team for bioterrorist
events includes health-care providers and law
enforcement, public health, and public safety
officials. Since medical examiners and coroners
generally work independently from other
members of this team, special efforts may be
necessary to ensure their inclusion in the
planning process.
Medical examiners and coroners have state
statutory authority to investigate violent,
suspicious, sudden, or unexplained deaths (1),
including those due to homicide, trauma, and
inapparent or poorly explained causes, such as
drugs, toxins, and infectious agents. The role of
these medical professionals in bioterrorism
response can be twofold: response to a known
terrorist attack and surveillance for unusual
deaths or clusters of deaths that may represent
an undetected attack. Deaths from terrorism
are homicides and therefore under the
jurisdiction of medical examiners and coroners.
These investigators are skilled in preserving
medicolegal evidence that may be important for
subsequent criminal proceedings and in
handling situations that involve mass deaths,
as shown by their participation in the
investigations of the Oklahoma City bombing,
aviation accidents, and heat-related deaths (2-4).
Medical examiners and coroners may also
play an important role in the detection of
bioterrorism since they may recognize unusual
deaths before health-care providers become
involved. Patients who die of infectious diseases
or poisoning often die at home (5,6). Even
patients who come to a health-care facility for
treatment may die precipitously and unexpect-
edly, without a clear diagnosis, and may come
under the jurisdiction of medical examiners and
coroners. For example, in the 1993 outbreak of
hantavirus pulmonary syndrome in the south-
western United States, medical examiners
played an important role in recognizing the
novel, rapidly fatal infectious syndrome (7).
Autopsies are an effective way of obtaining an
accurate diagnosis for deaths from infectious
diseases and toxic exposures. In 1979, autopsy
pathologists played a critical role in recognizing
inhalational anthrax cases caused by an acci-
dental discharge from a former Soviet
bioweapons laboratory (8). In 1985, Illinois
medical examiners identified the cause of death
of persons who ingested acetaminophen that
had been intentionally contaminated with
cyanide (9).
To be fully integrated into the medical, law
enforcement, and public health plans for
detecting and responding to bioterrorism,
medical examiners and coroners will need
information about the biological and chemical
agents likely to be used, access to laboratories
capable of identifying these agents, adequate
data management systems for mortality
surveillance, and improved autopsy facilities
and procedures to ensure that prosectors are
protected from infectious and chemical agents.
As a beginning, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention recently funded a model
medical examiner surveillance program for
bioterrorism mortality in New Mexico. Further
collaboration among federal, state, and local
agencies and medicolegal death investigators
will be required for the components of such a
program to be effective on a national scale.
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Seroprevalence of Human Hantavirus
Infection in the Ribeirão Preto Region
of São Paulo State, Brazil
To the Editor: Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome
(HPS) has been identified in the region of
Ribeirão Preto, São Paulo State, Brazil, since
1993 (1-4). As of September 1999, 38 HPS cases
had been reported in Brazil, 16 in the state of
São Paulo (2). Between May 1998 and August
1999, the Adolfo Lutz Institute (ALI) in São
Paulo city serologically confirmed five cases—
three fatal—in the Ribeirão Preto region: two
from Guariba, one from Jardinópolis, one from
Cajuru, and one from Cassia dos Coqueiros
(Luiza Teresinha Madia de Souza, ALI, pers.
comm.).
Despite these reports and suspicions of
additional cases, the prevalence of hantavirus
infection and HPS in the region is not known.
Laboratory confirmation has not been available
locally, and sending serum samples to ALI for
laboratory evaluation is not feasible in most
cases. Thus, only presumptive diagnoses could
be made until the Sin Nombre virus (SNV)
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA)
was developed.
To estimate the occurrence and distribution
of human hantavirus infection, we used SNV
ELISA to conduct a serologic survey of a sample
of hospital patients requiring venipuncture for
routine procedures. The patients came from
three regional cities: Ribeirão Preto, Guariba,
and Jardinópolis. Between February and June
1999, a total of 567 samples were collected: 257
from the public hospital of Guariba, 110 from
the public hospital in Jardinópolis, and 200
from the General Hospital of the School of
Medicine of Ribeirão Preto. When we compared
our sample with the general population, the
patients in the study sample were slightly older
but similar in sex distribution.
Sixteen additional samples were evaluated
to confirm the effectiveness of SNV ELISA in
diagnosing hantavirus infection: 12 from patients
in whom HPS was clinically suspected and 4
previously confirmed by ALI in the city of São
Paulo between May 1998 and August 1999.
Known HPS convalescent-phase plasma provided
by the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) was used as positive control. Nega-
tive controls were selected by simple random
sampling from all previously negative samples.
Positive and negative recombinant SNV
antigens provided by CDC were coated on
microtiter plates at 1:2,000 dilution in phos-
phate-buffered saline overnight at 4°C and used
in a standard immunoglobulin G testing format.
Reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reac-
tion analysis of serum from two fatal cases of
HPS occurring in the cities of Franca and
Araraquara suggested the presence of two
genetically distinct hantaviruses in the area
surrounding Ribeirão Preto. Antigen prepared
from local virus is not considered to be neces-
sary for immunoassays because the local virus
is not sufficiently different from other isolates
to require special antigen preparation (5).
All samples were screened in duplicate on
both positive and negative antigens in the
assay. A sample was considered positive if
absorbance on the positive antigen was greater
than absorbance on both the negative control
antigen and the negative control of the plate.
To confirm the diagnosis, samples satisfying
these criteria were tested in duplicate along
with 14 negative samples. Samples were
considered positive when their subtractive
absorbance was greater than the calculated
mean subtractive absorbance of the 14 negative
samples and three standard deviations.
From our serologic survey, the
seroprevalence of human hantavirus infection
was determined to be 1.23% (7/567) overall,
0.5% (1/200) in Ribeirão Preto, 0.4% (1/257) in
Guariba, and 4.5% (5/110) in Jardinópolis. If
one assumes the inhabitants sampled were
representative, the seroprevalence provides an
estimate of surviving past or recent hantavirus
infections in the area. As the overall antibody
prevalence of 1.23% is more than twice that
observed in the U.S. populations at risk for
hantavirus infection, such infections are not
rare in the Ribeirão Preto region (6).